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More on the dynamic Vickrey mechanism for multi-unit auctions: an 
experimental study on the emission permits initial auction 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the multiple-units auction literature, 
by testing the performance of the dynamic Vickrey auction (the Ausubel model), 
in an experimental setting, representing the functioning of an emission permits 
market with an Ausubel auction for the initial allocation of permits. Other 
features of the experiment include the possibility of banking and the inclusion of 
uncertainty, and the parameters were set so as to replicate an environment similar 
to the EU-ETS market. 
Our results reveal that emission permits are not exactly allocated as theoretically 
predicted in the Ausubel auction although the differences are not statistically 
significant.  
Comparison of our results with previous experimental studies on the same 
auction mechanism, although under very different conditions, indicate no 
relevant differences exist on the Ausubel auction performance, which is an 
important policy indication when decisions are being taken on the 
implementation of several auctions for multiple units, namely in the context of 
the EU-ETS. 
Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; dynamic Vickrey (Ausubel) auction; emission 
permits; experiments. 
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Introduction 
In contrast to the majority of the auctions experimentally tested in the literature 
that are single unit auctions, the CO2 emission permits auction deals with multiple 
homogeneous units . This is a distinctive characteristic of CO2 auctions and still remains 
a boundless field of investigation, as single unit auctions properties are not directly 
transposed to the multiple units’ case. 
Holt et al. (2007) report an extensive theoretical, empirical and experimental 
literature revision on this type of auctions. Moreover, these authors report their own 
results for a great number of experiments to test the performance of alternative auction 
mechanisms and support the decision adopted for the RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative). Holt et al. (2007) experiments’ besides considering the particular case of a 
multiple unit auction also include the possibility of banking/ borrowing of the permits 
bought at the auction and a secondary market where those permits could be traded. 
These characteristics actually exist in implemented emission permit markets - as the EU 
ETS, for instance - and with a potential to influence participants’ behavior at the 
auction, therefore its inclusion in the experimental design in order to make it valuable it 
is almost compulsory. From their experimental results, Holt et al. (2007) recommended 
the implementation of a static uniform price auction for the RGGI CO2 emission permits 
auction.
1
 Its simplicity, transparency and good allocation result were the basis for those 
authors recommendation. For the EU ETS, a study coordinated by Neuhoff and Matthes 
(2008) present a similar recommendation and the 2006 Ireland partial auction of CO2 
emission permits already implemented this format. In fact, sealed-bid uniform price 
                                                          
1
 Holt et al. (2007) experimentally tested five alternative auction formats for the RGGI: two static (unique 
and discriminative price auctions) and three dynamic (English, Dutch and Anglo-Dutch auctions). Price 
discovery, collusive behaviour avoidance, transparency, participants’ comprehension, revenues and 
efficiency are some of the aspects considered for the different auction formats evaluation. 
 
 
5 
 
auctions are well known by regulated utilities in the EU ETS and, probably for that 
reason, it has been used by Ireland, Hungary and Lithuania in the first phase of the EU 
ETS. 
However, these recommendations for the particular case of emission permits are 
opposed to multiple units’ auction theory. Ausubel and Cramton (2002), for instance, 
demonstrate how inefficient unique price auctions are for the case of multiple units. As 
winning bids have a positive probability of affecting equilibrium price, participants 
have an incentive to reduce demand – and the larger dimension of participants is, the 
stronger and more profitable is this behaviour. Therefore, Ausubel and Cramton (2002) 
conclude that the simplicity and efficiency usually associated with this auction format 
are eliminated. Ausubel and Cramton (2002) compare this inefficiency to that of 
monopoly losses, as larger dimension subjects lose some units to the smaller, even if 
they have higher valuation for those units. List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) evidences’ 
support this theoretical demand-reduction prediction for unique price auctions for 
multiple units, when compared to the Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961). Furthermore, 
these authors collect evidence that show auction revenues are not significantly different 
in the two auction formats and for that reason, no trade-off exist between the Vickrey 
auction efficiency and the auctioneer revenues. 
Considering Ausubel (2004) study and conclusions, the lack of consensus between 
theoretical recommendations and the empirical and experimental evidence about the 
best auction format to use under conditions similar to those of the EU ETS become even 
more acute. Ausubel (2004) recalls that existent multiple unit auctions do not respect 
two theoretical recommendations consensually agreed for single object auctions: 1) the 
need to guarantee an auction structure that allows winner paid price to be independent 
of the own winner’s bid (the Vickrey auction); and 2) the use of an open format, in 
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order to maximize the information available to participants, each moment a new 
proposal is made. English auctions are theoretically recommended for single objects 
precisely because they gather these two characteristics simultaneously, as pointed by 
McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Milgrom (1987), for instance. Ausubel (2004) 
successfully builds a model for homogenous multiple unit auctions that include those 
characteristics, therefore equivalent to the Vickrey auction but simpler to understand 
and administrate. This auction format even eliminates the problem identified under the 
Vickrey auction with reserve prices of having identical goods sold at different prices 
(Ausubel and Cramton (2004)). The efficiency of Ausubel (2004) auction format is not 
achieved with the biggest market participants buying the cheapest units in the market 
proposal, as happened under Ausubel and Cramton (2004) proposal, which additionally 
makes this model politically more acceptable and easily adopted. Hence, the Ausubel 
(2004) format seems the most theoretically adequate model to use in the case of an 
auction for the initial allocation of emission permits in general, and for the EU ETS in 
particular.  
Although other previous experiments have tested the performance of the Ausubel 
auction, they all considered a very simplified environment, with few participants and 
few units being offered at the auction. That was the case, for instance, of Kagel and 
Levin (2001 and 2009), Engelmann and Grimm (2004), and Manelli et al. (2006). In 
addition, none of them, however, parallel the EU ETS structure, which justified our 
decision to experimentally test the use of the Ausubel (2004) auction within a different 
experimental design.  
Our methodological choice to test the performance of the Ausubel (2004) auction for 
the specific case of the initial allocation of emission permits is based on the 
experiments' capacity to model each mechanism’s structure, therefore, being the 
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“cleanest” way of testing its performance, as Whitford (2007) labels them. Botelho et 
al. (2011) report the results of two experimental treatments, which aimed to test and 
compare the performance of a market institution similar to that of the EU ETS with a 
100% auction versus a 100% free allocation of CO2 permits. The current paper 
elaborates on the first stage of the 100% auction treatment reported in Botelho et al. 
(2011), which consisted of an Ausubel auction for the initial allocation of CO2 emission 
permits. With this analysis we intend to contribute with additional knowledge about the 
performance of the Ausubel auction, and verify the sensibility of problems like 
overbidding behavior or demand reduction, previously identified on some of the other 
experimental studies by the authors just mentioned, to the parameters and experimental 
design used. 
Our main finding is that there are no relevant differences between the Ausubel auction 
performance (with respect to prices, efficiency and revenues)when implemented under 
very complex conditions and when implemented in previously tested simpler laboratory 
experiments, which is an important policy indication when decisions are being taken on 
the implementation of several auctions for multiple units - namely, on the EU ETS. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the institutional rules 
of the experimental design implemented, with particular focus on the Ausubel (2004) 
auction format. Section 3 presents and discusses the experimental results and provides 
some comparisons with previous studies. Section 4 concludes discussing our main 
findings and pointing out some questions for future research. 
  
 
 
8 
 
Experimental setting 
The experimental setting implemented to represent a CO2 emission permits market 
which paralleled the EU ETS, as much as possible, and tested the performance of the 
Ausubel (2004) auction for permits initial allocation.
2
 The experiment consists of the six 
stages below, which were repeated 10 times in each session - corresponding to the fixed 
number of periods for the market to function in each session: 
Stage 1: Auction for initial emission permits allocation. 
Stage 2: Banking decision concerning permits bought at the auction. 
Stage 3: Re-sale (secondary) market. 
Stage 4: Random fluctuation on emissions (Uncertainty stage).  
Stage 5: Reconciliation market. 
Stage 6: Possibility for re-banking decisions. 
In addition to these tasks, subjects completed a risk elicitation task (in the vain 
of Holt and Laury (2002)) at the start of the experiment and a socio-demographic survey 
at the end. The institutional rules of these stages are next described though stage 1 in 
more detail. Used for the initial allocation of CO2 emission permits, the auction is only 
one part of the institution represented – although the central part, in what concerns the 
present paper. The other stages of the market institution implemented in our 
experimental design are briefly described, as they might influence our auction allocation 
outcome. 
 
  
                                                          
2
 The experimental sessions run for this treatment occurred in May 2009 at Minho University, with 
Economics undergraduate students and were programmed in Ztree (Fishbacher (2007)). 
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The Ausubel auction 
The first part of our experimental market for CO2 emission permits reported in 
Botelho et al. (2011) as the 100% auctioning treatment was the Ausubel (2004) auction 
(or dynamic Vickrey model). This may be considered an example of a microeconomic 
system as defined by Smith (1982), constituted by a specific environment and 
institution. Our microeconomic environment consisted of the characteristics of eight 
participants e = (e
1, …, e8), which could not be changed neither by the agents nor by the 
institutions where those interacted. This means vector e
i 
= (u
i
, T
i
, ωi) characterized each 
subject i, with utility function u
i
, for a specific technology T
i
 and a vector concerning 
the initial endowment of goods ωi. Therefore, e constitutes a set of control variables 
fixed by the investigator. These were derived from different marginal abatement cost 
curves, corresponding to different productive/abatement technologies, representing the 
higher polluter countries of the EU-15. A private value setting was then represented, 
with subjects' valuation for each emission permit not being affected by the information 
of the other participants. Table A.1 of the Appendix presents parameters for the vector 
e
i
 = (u
i
, T
i, ωi).3 
The institution I
i
 = (M
i
 , h
i
(m), c
i
(m), g
i
(t0, t, T)) of our microeconomic system (S 
= (e, I)), according to Smith (1982) nomenclature, defines each agent i property rights 
on communication and transactions, including de definition of messages he is allowed 
to send (M
i
); each agent allocation rules as a function of messages previously sent 
(h
i
(m)); cost imputation rules (c
i
(m)); and, finally, the process adjustment rules g
i
(t0, t, 
T), that includes a rule for the beginning g
i
(t0, ., .), the sequence g
i
(., t, .) and the end of 
the exchange of messages g
i
(., ., T), as we next describe.  
                                                          
3
 For more details about the parameters used see Botelho et al. (2011). 
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At the beginning of each of the 10 periods of our experimental sessions, the 
auctioneer announces a relatively low first price (99 points). Auctioneer maximum price 
proposed (1319) was strictly higher than the highest marginal abatement cost of all 
subjects, therefore, strictly higher than the maximum valuation any participant could 
give to an auctioned emission permit (1301). Therefore, Ausubel’s condition of non 
restrictive prices was respected, and last moment (T) was non-binding. 
The discrete version, with incomplete information, of the Ausubel (2004) 
auction was implemented, with a price p
t
 = t being announced by the auctioneer at each 
moment t = 0, 1, 2, …, T and subjects submitting the xi quantities they wanted to buy at 
each price. At each moment t = 0, 1, 2, …, T the auctioneer verifies if   
n
i
t
i Mx
1  
 and 
only when that happens, current period t is considered the last of the auction, L=t. At 
that moment each subject i receives quantity *ix  that respects conditions 
1*  Lii
L
i xxx
and   
n
i
i Mx
1
* . As long as excess demand is found and t < T the auction proceeds to 
period t+1, with price p
t+1
 (a 20 points addition is made to the previous price) and the 
process is repeated. Therefore, an increasing price, after all bids are made, indicates 
there is still excess demand on the auction. 
The number of units subjects acquire,  nitiC 1   are defined at any moment t 
according to Ausubel (2004): 
(1) 








 
ij
t
j
t
i xMC ,0max for any t=0,…, L-1 and i=1,…,n 
 In the last period of the auction, L, this vector corresponds to: 
(2) *i
L
i xC  , with 
*
ix the final quantity of permits bought by subject i. 
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The vector of acquired (“clinched”) units on current period t,  nitic 1 , 
corresponds to the difference between the quantity accumulated at moment t and 
moment t-1: 
(3) 
1 ti
t
i
t
i CCc , with t=1,…, L and 
00
ii Cc  for any i=1,…,n 
Our application is a dynamic multiple unit auction, with one seller allocating 
M=88 units of an homogeneous good to 8 buyers N={1, …, 8}. Each buyer i may be 
given any xi quantity of the good (CO2 emission permits, in this case), as long as
  
n
i
i Mx
1
 . Buyer i utility for xi equals the difference between its private value Ui(xi) 
and total payment yi  that he is obliged to do: Ui(xi)- yi. Although the Ausubel dynamic 
auction is possible to implement under different informational conditions, each buyer’s 
(decreasing) marginal utility function is private information in our experimental design. 
Additionally, while the auction is open, no information is given about the amount of 
units still available nor about the number of units each participant already acquired 
(clinched units). The only (private) information released during the auction is the 
number of profitable units at each new price. 
Our experimental design imposed a restriction on subjects’ proposals/ bids at the 
auction: participants could bid more units than those needed – and therefore, have no 
value to them (Ui(xi)=0) – but may not bid the total number of units offered in the 
auction (xi < 88). The maximum number of units each subject could bid at the auction 
( tix ) was determined accordingly to the following budget restriction:
 
0
*
p
px
x
eq
activity
it
i  , 
with p
0
=99 being the first price proposed by the auctioneer and peq=139 the equilibrium 
price of the Ausubel auction in the first period of our sessions. On the other hand, 
activity
ix corresponds to the number of units with positive value (Ui(xi)>0), i.e., the number 
 
 
12 
 
of units each subject needs to abate. If a participant buys more units than the ones he 
needs for the current period, 
activity
ii
t
i xxx  , 
activity
ii xx  units are automatically 
banked for the next period.
4 
The rules for the sequence of messages while the auction was open, g
i
(., t, .), 
included the above budget constraint and two other rules defined by Ausubel (2004): 
(4) 
1 tti xx , ni ,...,1  and Tt ,...,1 .  
(5) 
1 ti
t
i Cx
for any  i=1,…,n and t=1,…,T. 
Condition (4) corresponds to the monotonicity rule. That is to say, at each 
moment t bidders could not bid more than at the previous moment. On the other hand, 
bids at any moment t could not be less than the clinched units at the previous price 
(condition (5)). 
The verification of one of the following conditions was the stopping rule, 
g
i
(.,.,T), of our auction: 
(i) Auctioneer price reaches 1319; 
(ii) Distribution of the total amount of units available at the auction (
  
n
i
i Mx
1
); 
(iii) The price reached is such that   
n
i
i Mx
1
. 
                                                          
4
 This may be considered a restrictive rule to subjects’ behavior but it turned out to be non-binding. 
Only Subject 2 at Auction 1 session, in one period, bought more than the necessary permits.  
Additionally, this rule was included in the zTree programme but it was not explicitly included in the 
experimental instructions given to the participants - they were only told the maximum amount of 
units they could bid each period at the auction (
activity
i
t
i xx  ). 
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When the auction closes each buyer is informed of the (own) amount of units 
bought and at what prices – as well as their total earnings in the auction.  
The allocation rule of the auctioned units between each subject i (h
i
(m)) are 
those defined in Ausubel (2004), and reproduced in equations (1) to (3). As it is clear 
from those rules, each subject’s allocation depends on other participants’ messages, not 
on his/her own messages. At each price p
t
 and for each buyer i, the auctioneer 
determines the residual demand (the sum of other subjects’ quantity demand, excluding 
its own: ∑j≠i xj
t
), that is then compared with total supply, M=88. For any participant 
with ∑j≠i xj
t 
<88, the auctioneer allocates M - ∑j≠i xj
t
 units. 
For the case when the stopping rule consisted of that pointed on (iii), ie, price is 
such that total demand is less than total supply, a rationing rule, was introduced in our 
experimental design. The use of this rule guarantees the allocation of the 88 units 
available, as predicted in the Ausubel (2004) theoretical model, respects the 
monotonicity rule and the allocation of the units already clinched at previous prices. 
This rule, similar to that of Mochón et al. (2005), starts identifying, for the price 
immediately before to the one that caused excess supply (therefore, a price where 
excess demand still existed), the subject with the higher non-satisfied bids. One bided 
unit is automatically withdrawn from this subject and total demand re-calculated. If 
demand is still higher than supply, the procedure continues by identifying the next 
subject with higher bids not yet acquired. Only when demand equals supply is this 
process stopped and the auctioneer allocates the emission permits according to the rules 
previously specified, bidders are informed of how many units they bought, at what 
prices and their respective earnings.5 
                                                          
5
 Although not for the Ausubel auction format, Burtraw et al. (2011) implemented a somewhat 
similar rule to deal with the possibility of unsold units in the last round. 
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Obviously, if total supply exceeds total demand at the first price the auctioneer 
proposes, some units will not be allocated. The rule we defined for these situations was 
that emission permits not allocated should be cancelled, which means that these permits 
are not carried forward to next periods within the session. In other words, if   
n
i
i Mx
1
at moment 0, each bidder would be allocated the number of units (xi
0
) submitted at the 
initial price, p
0
. The  
n
i
ixM
1
permits not sold would be canceled and a more 
restrictive than planned environmental target is achieved at the current period - and, as a 
consequence, total abatement costs are higher than predicted. This rule has no 
connection with the Ausubel (2004) model as the author mentions nothing about this 
possibility. On this topic, we found Holt et al. (2007) reflection on the alternatives for 
the non-allocated permits at an auction: (i) cancelling; (ii) future periods use; (iii) and 
contingency banking. These authors pointed out that all the options have advantages and 
disadvantages but recommend the cancelling of non-sold permits at the auction, 
particularly for recently created emission permits markets, with loose caps (which was 
the case for the EU ETS, at least in its first phases). 
Finally, the cost imputation rule (ci(m)) used in the auction implemented – 
according to Smith (1982) nomenclature - was as follows. At the end of the auction 
each bidder pays the total amount of units acquired at each of the clinching prices: yi = 
∑ pt cti, with c
t
i the number of units bought by subject i at price p
t
. Total earnings of 
each subject were determined through the difference Ui(xi)-yi. 
The experiment included other tasks such as banking, uncertainty and a 
reconciliation market, however as the results of these tasks are not the object of the 
present paper we abstain from explaining each in detail.6 It should however be noted 
                                                          
6
 A detailed description of the tasks can be found in Botelho et al. (2011).  
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that the presence of uncertainty coupled with the possibility of banking may change the 
behavior in the initial allocation Ausubel auction. Uncertainty about effective emissions 
abatement was included in our experimental design,
7
 which means that the exact 
amount of emission permits each participant would need during the experimental 
session was also uncertain. 
In this stage, each subject was informed about random variation on emissions 
drawn from a uniform distribution over the values (-1, 0, +1), following Godby et al. 
(1997) procedure, which means each period maximum noncompliance (or surplus) 
would be of one emission permit. At this point, information about consequences of 
these random variations for participants' earnings in the period, as well as possible ways 
to minimize losses or even make profits was also given. 
Emission permits’ price volatility and noncompliance were the main 
consequences of this stage. As a severe penalty for noncompliance was introduced,
8
 the 
use of banked units emerges as a possibility to avoid this loss – on the last stage of each 
period. If the subjects did not bank any unit before (or did but intend to keep it for 
future periods), they might still try to obtain the necessary emission permit in the 
secondary market that opens after this uncertainty stage.  
Subjects' banking behavior is expected to differ according to their attitudes 
towards risk. Risk neutral and risk averse subjects should bank one permit during the 
entire session, as a precaution against the possibility of a bad draw in the uncertainty 
stage (Stage 4 on each period of the session), while risk lover subjects are not expected 
                                                          
7
 Measurement errors, unpredicted factors that influence the availability of resources like energy or 
different kind of fuels, which represent, at the end, more or less pollution than planned at the 
beginning, are just some examples that justify this uncertainty. 
8
 Similarly to article 16º of 2003/87/EC Directive, besides a monetary penalty – that we established 
as being an amount about four times the emission permits equilibrium price -, subjects were obliged 
to deliver one emission permit more on the period after being noncompliant. 
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to bank (at least for precautionary reasons). Following Godby et al. (1997) terminology, 
computed benchmarks for the first case were called Market Equilibrium Benchmark and 
for the second, System Equilibrium Benchmark. 
The banking decision may impact on the next period initial auction: if emission 
permits are saved in the current period, it may imply less units being demanded at the 
auction, with consequences for the equilibrium price. Although a possible consequence 
of banking it is not a compulsory one under our experimental set as subjects may bid 
exactly the same units as if they decided not to bank at all. After the resolution of 
uncertainty, subjects could use a reconciliation market to sell surpluses or compensate 
deficits. After this stage subjects could again revise their banking decisions. 
Each of our experimental sessions repeated the laboratorial market, consisting of 
the six stages just described, for 10 periods. Reduction of total abatement costs was 
each participant's objective, which corresponded directly into earnings, in lab points that 
were converted to Euro and paid individually at the end of the session. 
Although constituted by several parts other than the initial auction, the next 
section will focus on this stage. However, the description just made for the other stages 
of our experiments may not be considered extemporary as those stages might influence 
the auction results or enlighten us about them. Moreover, subjects’ behavior at the 
auction may be influenced for what happens on the other stages, therefore the analysis 
need to take that into account. 
Results 
Botelho et al (2011) analyzing the same data conclude that participants were 
mainly risk averse.
9
 However, this attitude towards risk was not related to the specific 
characteristics of the subjects that constituted our sample. Additionally, both the non 
                                                          
9
 From the total 24 subjects participating in our experimental sessions only 1 was classified as risk 
lover. 
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parametric tests and the maximum likelihood estimates of the hurdle model of banking 
decisions revealed no association between subjects' risk preferences and their banking 
level, contrarily to what we theoretically expected, based on Godby et al. (1997).
10
 
As the study of the Ausubel auction performance for the initial allocation of 
emission permits is the main goal of the current paper, we will now go through the 
results of the first stage of our experimental setting with some detail. 
 
 
Effects on 1st Stage Prices 
We start looking at auction closing prices registered in our three experimental 
sessions (Auction 1, 2 and 3)and compare them with the theoretical benchmarks. Note 
that we consider the auction closing price to be the last (and highest) price paid for the 
emission permits bought at the auction. This means that when the rationing rule is 
applied the auction closing price does not correspond to the price called by the 
auctioneer at the last round of the session but to the price called on the round 
immediately before (as previously explained, section 2.1). 
Figure 1 represents both the theoretical benchmarks and the observed auction 
closing prices, averaged for the three experimental sessions run. 11 As it becomes clear, 
the session average auction closing prices are below our theoretical benchmarks, except 
for period 5 and 10, which, respectively, are slightly above and exactly correspond to 
the theoretical predictions. These differences between observed mean auction closing 
                                                          
10
 See Botelho et al. (2011) for more details on banking results and its statistical analysis.  
11
 The Market and the System Equilibrium benchmark auction closing prices differ only on the last 
period of the session as we suppose subjects holding one emission permit at this point (due to 
precautionary reasons) reduce demand on the auction. The market equilibrium is the optimal path 
for risk neutral and averse subjects; the system equilibrium is the optimal path for risk loving 
subjects. 
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prices and our theoretical benchmarks are statistically significant for the usual levels of 
confidence (z=2.728; p=0.0064 and z=2.572; p=0.0101, respectively, for the System and 
Market benchmarks). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Observed average auction closing prices and System Optimum and Market 
Equilibrium benchmarks 
 
Effects on 1st Stage Revenues 
Every auction, for the three sessions, closed with all (88) emission permits sold 
and, although with prices statistically different from the theoretical benchmarks, all 
sessions registered a value of about 90% of the potential revenue for the Ausubel 
auction (with values for Auction 2 around 95%), as shown by Figure 2. Considering 
System Optimum and Market Equilibrium references, on average, the three sessions 
attained 90,8% and 92% of the potential revenues, respectively.  
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Figure 2 - Ratio between realized auction revenue, in each session, and potential 
revenue for System Optimum and Market Equilibrium benchmarks   
 
Effects of 1st Stage Efficiency 
More importantly, however, are the results concerning the efficiency of the 
implemented auction, ie, the CO2 emission permits allocation between the different 
subjects (polluters/ emitters) and the consequent amount of abatement costs. As we can 
see In Table 1 and Figure 3, abatement costs are higher than our theoretical 
benchmarks, and this is statistically different according to the Wilcoxon nonparametric 
test. Auction 1 and 2 register an efficiency level relatively closer to the theoretically 
predicted for the Ausubel auction (about 12% and 7% more than the theoretical 
references, respectively) but, on average, the three sessions registered only an 85,3% 
and 85,6% efficiency level, considering System Optimum and Market Equilibrium 
references, respectively - which is a lower value than found in previous studies on this 
auction format, as next presented in Table 3. 
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Table 1 – Auction abatement cost benchmarks and observed values 
 Abatement Cost 
Benchmarks 
 Observed Abatement Cost 
Period System Market  Auction 1  Auction 2  Auction 3 
1 2288 2288  2457  2286  2403 
2 2313 2324  2659  2328  4143 
3 2288 2288  3121  2299  4143 
4 2288 2288  2389  2299  2432 
5 2390 2390  2377  2298  3617 
6 2288 2288  2587  2299  2582 
7 2288 2288  2831  2489  3005 
8 2288 2288  2394  2748  2831 
9 2288 2288  2599  2526  2389 
10 2288 2360  2389  3074  2916 
Total  23007 23090  25803  24646  30461 
 
 
Figure 3 – Ratio between abatement costs after closing auction, in each session, and 
potential abatement costs for System Optimum and Market Equilibrium benchmarks 
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Differences between the realized and potential abatement costs must be 
explained by emission permits allocation that resulted from the auction, in each session. 
In fact, an auction performance indicator is precisely its allocation of emission permits 
among subjects, as an efficient auction model would award emission allowances to 
those subjects who value them the most (i.e., subjects with higher marginal abatement 
costs). Table 2 shows that, considering the results of the three experimental sessions, all 
the available units for sale at the auction were in fact sold but no exact correspondence 
exists between predicted allocations by subject type and those observed averaged over 
the 10 auction periods. Nonetheless, based on the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test we 
conclude that observed differences are not statistically significant, which means we 
cannot exclude the hypothesis that the implemented auction produces the sincere bids 
predicted. 
Table 2 – Predicted and observed permit allocation in the Ausubel auction 
 Subject Type 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 Total 
System benchmark 4.9 10.8 15.2 4.0 15.0 15.9 16.1 6.1 88.0 
Market benchmark 4.9 10.7 15.4 3.9 15.1 15.8 16.1 6.1 88.0 
Observed 4.5 9.5 16.5 3.5 15.2 15.7 16.7 6.4 88.0 
Note: Predicted outcomes are the averaged values of Table A.2 in the Appendix, over the 10 
auction periods. For the observed permit allocation the same procedure was used: the 
average over the three sessions and 10 periods was calculated. 
 
As Engelmann and Grimm (2004) point out, however, measuring efficiency in 
this way ignores the actual magnitude of potential efficiency losses due to 
misallocations. As those authors highlight, to allocate one unit to the “wrong” bidder 
may either cause huge or insignificant welfare losses, respectively, when his valuation 
is substantially or just slightly below the other bidders’ valuation. Our biggest 
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participants in the auction (S3 and S7), with lower marginal valuations, were allocated 
more than the efficient number of units while, on the contrary, participants with higher 
marginal abatement costs (like S1, S2 or S4, for instance) were allocated less than the 
efficient number of units. This misallocation is thus reflected on the ratio between 
realized abatement costs at the end of each auction and potential abatement costs even 
if, overall, we cannot exclude the implemented auction produced sincere bids. 
Considering our experimental results for the efficiency and revenues of the 
implemented auction we might find evidence about the often voiced argument, at least 
for some auction formats, on the existence of some tradeoff between the auction 
revenues and the efficiency level obtained. In fact, taking the overall results of the 
experiment, realized revenues were considerably high but the same did not occur in 
terms of the efficiency observed for the implemented auction. However, our goal was to 
test the Ausubel auction format for the initial allocation of CO2 emission permits under 
a very complex experimental setting, which included, among other stages, a secondary 
market for CO2 emission permits re-sale. At that stage, as reported on Botelho et al. 
(2011), some allocation corrections effectively occurred, which resulted in a very 
efficient institution for a CO2 emission permits market, with the inherent positive 
consequences on CO2 emissions total abatement costs. 
Based on the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test applied to per period means, for 
the conventional significance levels, we concluded that per period mean abatement 
costs are not statistically different from either the System or the Market benchmarks, 
when considering the entire six stages of the market. That is to say, that if we refer to 
abatement costs resultant of all the stages/ decisions taken each period of the session, 
including not only the auction allocation but also banking, secondary market 
participation, uncertainty resolution, reconciliation market participation and, finally, the 
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re-banking decision, values are different from the ones reported In Table 1 and Figure 3 
- which respect only to the abatement costs resultant from the emission permits 
allocation at the end of stage 1 of each period. Therefore, the utmost objective of the 
market institution represented is achieved: total abatement costs under an experimental 
setting mimicking the EU ETS that uses the Ausubel auction for the initial allocation of 
permits are minimized. Additionally, windfall profits resultant from the grandfathering 
of permits are avoided and, on the contrary, significant auction revenues are realized, 
which can be used to minimize pollution impacts. 
 
Comparison with previous experimental results 
Although not for the particular case of pollutants emission permits, Kagel and 
Levin (2001 and 2009), Engelmann and Grimm (2004) and Manelli et al. (2006) also 
experimentally tested the Ausubel (2004) auction format. Their results concerning the 
auction efficiency and revenues differed from each other, as we can see iIn Table 3. 
However, no clear evidence for the efficiency/revenue tradeoff argument can be 
identified from their values either, even if our experimental results concerning the 
Ausubel auction efficiency are clearly the lowest obtained - but close to those of 
Manelli et al. (2006). Our results for the auctioneer revenues' cannot be considered 
unsatisfactory, as actual average auction revenues are about 91% (92%) of potential 
auction revenues for the system (market) benchmark, which is quite high, even when 
compared with the previous experimental studies for the Ausubel (2004) auction, as 
shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – Comparisons of Ausubel (2004) auction results’ in different experimental 
studies 
 Botelho et 
al (2011) 
Manelli et 
al (2006) 
Kagel & 
Levin 
(2001) 
Engelman & 
Grimm 
(2004) 
Kagel & 
Levin 
(2009) 
Kagel & 
Levin*
12
 
(2009) 
Efficiency 0.853 
(0.856) 
0.871 
 
0.9926 
 
0.956 0.9863 0.9663 
Seller 
Revenue 
 
90.76  
(92.02) 
(percentage 
of potential 
revenue) 
52.2 
 (percentage 
of potential 
revenue) 
100.25 
(percentage 
of potential 
revenue) 
84.74 
(percentage 
of potential 
revenue) 
-0.191 
(difference 
from 
sincere 
bidding) 
-1.717 
(difference 
from 
sincere 
bidding) 
Note 1: Results under Botelho et al (2011) report the System Optimum benchmark case and in parentheses 
the Market Equilibrium results.  
Note 2: For Kagel and Levin (2001) we report their pooled results, concerning the number of computer 
rivals (one session with 3 and other with 5).   
Note 3: Efficiency reported for Engelmann and Grimm (2004) consist of what the authors called Relative 
efficiency (the total welfare relative to the maximum possible welfare).  
Note 4: Results reported for Kagel and Levin (2009), under both informational conditions, consist of the 
average results of the 3 sub-periods of their experiments (1-12; 13-24; and 25-36), where supply 
goes from 2 to 3 and again to 2 units. 
 
Efficiency results obtained from Manelli et al. (2006) led them to conclude that 
sincere bidding transparency of English auctions for private value single units it is not a 
common characteristic for similar auction formats for the multiple units' case. These 
authors claimed participants do not reveal the true value for each unit but bided too high 
(overbidding behavior) however their conclusions are not corroborated by the other 
experimental studies mentioned in Table 3.  
                                                          
12 Kagel & Levin* (2009) stands for the experimental results of the Ausubel auction without drop-out information, which are also the informational 
conditions under our experimental treatment. Kagel & Levin (2009) refer to those authors results’ when the full bid information Ausubel auction is 
implemented. 
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Although with similar goals, these studies present some differences in the 
experimental design, which may justify their results’ divergence. Table 4 summarize the 
main characteristics of the experimental studies that we report on the Ausubel (2004) 
auction, as well as our own.13 
Table 4 – Characteristics of some Ausubel (2004) auction experimental studies  
 Botelho et al 
(2011) 
Manelli et al 
(2006) 
Kagel & Levin 
(2001) 
Engelman & 
Grimm (2004) 
Kagel & Levin 
(2009) 
Informational 
rules 
- No bid 
information. 
- Aggregate 
bid 
information 
(full 
information 
but without 
disclosing the 
identity of 
the bidders). 
- Full bid 
information. 
- Full bid 
information (as 
there were 
only 2 
participants in 
the auction). 
- Two 
different 
experimental 
treatments: 
one with full 
bid 
information 
and other 
without. 
Number of 
bidders in the 
auction 
8 (invariant) 3 (invariant). 
Participant A, 
B, C 
1 human 
participant + 
3 or 5 
(variant) 
computer 
rivals 
2 4 (invariant) 
Number of 
units sold 
(supply) 
88  
 
3 2 2 Either 2 or 3 
(2 per period 
1-12 
3 per period 
13-24 
2 per period 
25-36) 
Individual’s 
demand) 
Dependent on 
the subject 
type (different 
for all the 8 
participants) 
and period 
(according to 
banking 
decisions and 
penalties for 
2 units - 1 unit 
(computer 
bidders’) 
- 2 units 
(human 
participants). 
 
2 2 
                                                          
13
 Although some of these authors test the Ausubel auction for the private and common value case (as 
well as other auction formats), Table 4 refers only to the game of incomplete information (privately 
known marginal value function), as it is the only case we experimentally tested. 
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 Botelho et al 
(2011) 
Manelli et al 
(2006) 
Kagel & Levin 
(2001) 
Engelman & 
Grimm (2004) 
Kagel & Levin 
(2009) 
incompliance). 
 
Units’ 
marginal 
valuation 
during the 
session 
The same in all 
auctions. 
Valuations for 
bidders A, B 
and C 
unchanged 
during the 
session. But 
participants 
changed roles 
at the 
beginning of 
every 
auction.  
New random 
valuations at 
the beginning 
of each 
auction (both 
for human 
and computer 
bidders). 
New random 
valuations at 
the beginning 
of each 
auction. 
New random 
valuations at 
the beginning 
of each 
auction. 
Overbidding  
possibility 
YES  YES (and even 
buy all the 
available 
units at the 
auction). 
YES YES YES 
Procedure in 
the case of 
excess supply 
Rationing rule 
mechanism 
that 
guaranteed all 
available units 
at the auction 
were allocated. 
Auction 
closed with 
unassigned 
units not 
being 
allocated.  
n.a. n.a. Parameters 
chosen 
eliminated 
potential 
excess supply 
problems. 
Number of 
auctions  
10 20 27 10 36 
Re-sale after 
auction 
YES NO NO NO NO 
Intertemporal 
connection 
between 
rounds  
YES
(a)
 NO NO NO NO 
(a) Due to the possibility of banking and the penalty structure implemented for incompliance, which 
resulted in different demand schedules at each auction 
 
As we can see from Table 4, our experimental design is the one who provides 
the bidders at the auction with less information. That does not prevent us from obtaining 
efficiency results similar those obtained under richer informational experimental 
settings, as it is the case of Manelli et al. (2006) study. This seems to show that 
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informational conditions are not determinants for the outcome of this auction model, 
contrarily to Kagel and Levin's (2009) conclusion on the importance of the feedback 
information for the superior performance of the Ausubel auction (in addition to the 
dynamic format characteristic). 
If for the informational rules,our experiment appears as the simplest one of the 
reported above, the same does not happen for the rest of the items. The number of 
participants in our auction is higher and the number of units being sold is considerably 
larger than any in other experiment referred. This last aspect is particularly distinctive 
from all the previous experiments on the Ausubel auction, as usually there were only 3 
units being sold and we auctioned a total of 88 units (representing emission permits). 
Adding also different individual demands for all the participants in the auction, due to 
its different dimension and cost structures, we definitely represented an experimental 
setting closer to several real life situations than the previous studies did. 
All the experimental sets for the Ausubel auction allowed for non-profitable 
transactions, as signaled in Table 4 under the item " Overbidding Possibility", but only 
Manelli et al. (2006) allowed for the acquisition of the total amount of units auctioned 
(three), even if participants’ valuations were only for two units. Although our 
experimental design included a restriction that did not allow subjects to buy the 88 units 
available at the auction (xi<88), participants could bid more units than those they need 
– and with no value to them (Ui(xi)=0) – as long as respecting the budget restriction 
rule imposed (
0
*
p
px
x
eq
activity
it
i  ).This condition imposed in our experimental design is an 
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intermediate situation between Kagel and Levin (2001) and Manelli et al. (2006) 
designs. 
14
 
Precisely because some participants used the possibility of buying all units 
available at the auction, an efficiency loss was registered by Manelli et al. (2006). With 
only three units being auctioned among three participants, an aggressive bidding 
behavior from one subject prevented her/his competitors to have access to any unit of 
the good being sold. This strategic behavior may not be considered too risky as the 
"only" negative consequence, if successfully buying all the units available for sale, 
would be the loss associated with the price paid for the third (worthless) unit. However, 
Manelli et al. (2006) consider this to be a much harder and risky behavior to use within 
an experimental setting with a higher number of units being auctioned. Precisely, in our 
experimental design it was too risky and expensive to use such a strategy (of bidding for 
the 88 available units!), therefore we would not expect our risk adverse participants to 
use such an extreme strategy - and our results show they effectively did not. Manelli et 
al. (2006) did not characterize subjects participating in their experiments concerning 
their risk attitudes so we cannot exclude this as a potential explanation for the different 
strategies observed. However, we tend to rather believe parameters are the key behind 
subjects' different behavior and agree with Manelli’s et al. (2006) conjecture concerning 
their results’ robustness/sensibility to the number of participants and units being 
auctioned. 
Although our efficiency results are close to those of Manelli et al. (2006), as 
shown In Table 3, and some similarities may be found with our experimental design - 
for instance, the authors maintain units’ marginal valuation during the session (although 
                                                          
14 This budget restriction did not reveal to be binding in our experimental setting and was set in 
motion only for participant S2 in Auction 1. 
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subject's role is randomly changed during the session) -, it is clear from Table 4 that 
significant differences exist. Namely, under Manelli et al. (2006) experimental set, 
bidding for the third unit at the auction was worthless to the subjects because they had 
valuation for only two units but under our experiments bidding for more units than 
needed (units with zero marginal value) was not necessarily worthless for subjects 
because of the existence of a secondary market and the possibility of banking. In fact, 
within our experimental set, subjects could expect to use the "worthless" units to 
influence the resale market outcome, either in the current period or on the following 
ones (by using the possibility of banking). However, overbidding behavior was not 
present in our sessions, except in Auction 1 by a single subject.
15
 This was, however, an 
outlier result in our experiments. 
Therefore, even if a priori we could identify in our experimental design 
additional "incentives" to overbid at the auction stage, our results do not confirm the 
existence of such a problem for the experimental Ausubel auction implemented. If 
Manelli's et al. (2006) low efficiency results were due to overbidding behavior that was 
not the reason for the misallocation of emission permits registered in our experimental 
sessions. 
A different type of problem, a demand reduction behavior by submitting 
extremely low bids, was pointed by Engelman and Grimm (2004) and registered also in 
some of our auctions.However, demand reduction registered within our experimental 
design might be associated with the existence of additional stages during the session, 
particularly, the possibility of banking. This intertemporal connection between rounds 
                                                          
15
 Subject 2 overbid 5 units on period 3 and 1 unit on periods 6 and 8. On period 3, besides buying 
5 units at a loss at the auction closing price, Subject 2 bought a total of 16 emission permits at the 
auction, when its total pollutant emissions for the period were of only 13 - therefore, buying 3 more 
units than necessary (
activity
ii xx  ). 
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introduced by the possibility of banking, as well as the existence of a re-sale market for 
the permits bought at the auction, add new and different explanations to the demand 
reduction behavior, in comparison to that of Engelman and Grimm (2004), for instance. 
Effectively, we found this connection between subject's demand reduction in the auction 
and their banking decisions for more than one unit in previous periods. 16 Namely, in 
our auction 3 session', subject 2 submitted reduced bids on 6 out of 10 periods, in 
comparison to those that would be profitable, which therefore characterized as a 
demand reduction behavior. Additionally, we saw this same subject banking more than 
one unit on the periods before his demand reduction on the auction. Session results' 
suffered as a consequence of this demand reduction because subjects with the lowest 
marginal costs were allocated more units than optimal. This behavior helps explaining 
the poorest results of Auction 3 in terms of efficiency, as it was clear at Figure 3, where 
that session appeared as the one with the highest ratio between abatement costs after 
closing auction and potential abatement costs. 
Conclusion 
Experiments used to test the performance of the dynamic Vickrey mechanism 
for multi-unit auctions - the Ausubel (2004) model -, either by Engelman and Grimm 
(2004), Manelli et al. (2006), Kagel and Levin (2001 and 2009) or our own, differ on 
the experimental setting employed. Although different, the previous experiments on the 
Ausubel auction presented more similarities with each other than did ours. For instance, 
on all the previous experimental studies reported, the number of units supplied and 
demanded at the auction, as well as the number of bidders, is very reduced and inferior 
to those we included in our experiments. However, in comparison with those studies, 
                                                          
16
 Risk aversion may not be pointed as a possible explanation for such a behavior because even for 
risk adverse subjects' optimal banking behavior consists in keeping only one unit during the entire 
session. 
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the major difference of our experiment is the fact of analyzing the Ausubel' (2004) 
auction performance for the initial allocation of pollutant emission permits. Trying to 
parallel the EU ETS case, which constitutes a novel contribution to the analysis of the 
performance of plicy oriented experimental investigations in the area of multi-unit 
auctions. Nevertheless, our experimental results confirm many of the previous 
experimental results suggesting that the Ausubel auction format under evaluation may 
be used under complex institutional settings, such us the EU ETS, and still result very 
effective.  
Results obtained in our experimental sessions, however, indicate that the 
Ausubel auction implemented do not guarantee emission permits to be efficiently 
allocated,  to the subjects who value them the most. Although theoretically efficient for 
the allocation of multiple units, the Ausubel auction did not produce the CO2 emission 
abatement cost reduction expected. The existence of a secondary market after the 
auction, though, allowed emission permits to be efficiently reallocated, which resulted 
in a clear reduction of total abatement costs. Overall, the institution represented in the 
lab realized almost all the potential earnings, which means it produces the predicted 
efficiency results. 
The ability for the dynamic Vickrey auction to overcome the demand reduction 
problem existent on unique price auctions for multiple units, pointed by Ausubel and 
Cramton (2002), and questioned by Engelman and Grimm (2004) experimental results 
is, to some extent, also questioned by our results. However, the demand reduction 
registered within our experimental design (though observed for a single subject) might 
be associated with the existence of additional stages during the session, particularly, the 
possibility of banking. This intertemporal connection between rounds introduced by the 
possibility of banking, as well as the existence of a re-sale market for the permits 
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bought at the auction, addd new and different explanations to the observed demand 
reduction behavior. 
Still, the overbidding problem identified by Manelli et al. (2006) experimental 
study on the Ausubel (2004) auction was not present in our experiments. Most of the 
participants in our experiment were risk averse and this may explain why the bidding 
strategy present at Manelli et al. (2006) experiments’ was not identified in our sessions. 
However, as those authors did not include any procedure for the elicitation of subjects’ 
risk aversion attitudes, we cannot argue for sure that differences in our results are a 
consequence of diverse subject’s pool characteristics. This constitutes an important 
methodological contribution of the present paper for this kind of experiments: the use of 
a Multiple Price List, or any other instrument, to elicit subjects’ risk aversion attitudes 
and, therefore, obtain a more complete characterization of the participants in the 
experiments. Additionally, it adds arguments to the ongoing discussion about the 
importance of parameters for the experimental results. In fact, even if participants in 
Manelli et al. (2006) experiments’ were as risk averse as our participants, the use of the 
same strategy in our experiments could be much more harming because potential losses 
were much higher. With more subjects in the auction and considerably more units being 
auctioned (88 instead of only 3) overbidding it is not an attractive strategy but an 
extremely risky one, which gives reason to claims on experimental economics literature 
saying parameters do matter! 
Our experiments implemented the simplest version of the Ausubel (2004) 
auction concerning its informational conditions. Although not for the particular case of 
Emission Permit Markets, Kagel and Levin (2009) experimental study highlighted the 
importance of revealing information about the drop outs that occur at each price, while 
the auction is open, as well as about the clinched units. These authors concluded not 
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only the dynamic characteristics of the Ausubel auction influence and explain its 
superiority in comparison to the Vickrey’s format but also the informational conditions 
under which it is implemented (complete versus incomplete). Only additional 
experimental sessions would be able to confirm their results for the case on emission 
permits initial allocation and this is a direction for future research: to replicate our 
experimental setting for the Ausubel (2004) auction (parallel to the EU ETS), including 
different informational conditions. 
Another line for future research is to experimentally test and compare the 
performance of the Ausubel (2004) auction with alternative auction formats, namely, 
the uniform price proposed by Montero (2008) for the allocation of the commons (as the 
emission permits auction is an example for such application). 
Given the growing importance of emission permits markets as an environmental 
policy instrument worldwide to halt, or at least diminish, GHG emissions, further 
research about this instrument and the relevance of institutional rules for its 
performance is more than justified. We have focused on the EU ETS because it is 
currently an example for other countries/ regions of the world considering the use of 
emission permits markets to achieve their environmental objectives. China, for instance, 
has stated on its 12
th
 Five-Year National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(2011-2015) the objective to cut CO2 emission per unit of GDP in 2015 by 17% based 
on the level of 2010, establishing an ETS, among other measures. Therefore, additional 
experiments like the one reported on this paper are necessary, as many other aspects/ 
variables can be evaluated in this way, before implementing such a program in reality. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 - Marginal abatement costs 
Units  
Belgium 
(S1) 
 
Spain 
(S2) 
 
Germany 
(S3) 
 
Greece 
(S4) 
 
France 
(S5) 
 
Italy 
(S6) 
 
U.K. 
 (S7) 
 
Netherlands 
 (S8) 
1 
 76  37  4  59  21  17  6  32 
2 
 177  90  11  149  56  42  15  76 
3 
 291  152  18  255  100  72  25  127 
4 
 413  220  27  374  151  105  37  182 
5 
 543  294  36  503  208  140  50  241 
6 
 678  372  46    270  177  63  304 
7   
 454  56    337  216  77  369 
8   
 539  67    408  257  92  436 
9   
 627  79    483  300  107  506 
10   
 719  91    561  344  123   
11   
 813  103    643  389  140   
12   
 909  115    729  436  157   
13   
 1008  128    817  484  174   
14     
 142    908  533  192   
15     
 155    1002  583  210   
16     
 169    1099  634  228   
17     
 184    1199  686  247   
18     
 198    1301  739  266   
19 
     213      792  286   
20     
 228      847  306   
21     
 243 
      
 326 
  
22     
 259 
      
 346 
  
23     
 274 
      
 367 
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Units  
Belgium 
(S1) 
 
Spain 
(S2) 
 
Germany 
(S3) 
 
Greece 
(S4) 
 
France 
(S5) 
 
Italy 
(S6) 
 
U.K. 
 (S7) 
 
Netherlands 
 (S8) 
24     
 290 
      
 388 
  
25     
 307 
      
 409 
  
26     
 
323       
 431 
  
27     
 340 
      
  
  
28     
 356 
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Table A.2 - Predicted Allocation of Permits in the Ausubel Auction 
Period 
Subject Type 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 
1 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
2 5 10 16(15) 4 15 15(16) 16 7 
3 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
4 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
5 4 10 17 4 15 15 17 6 
6 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
7 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
8 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
9 5 11 15 4 15 16 16 6 
10 5 10(11) 16(15) 3(4) 16(15) 16 16 6 
Note: Values in the cells are Market benchmarks (within brackets are System benchmarks when  
                     different from the Market). 
 
 
